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**1962/11/09**

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## Memorandum

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: JAN 2002THE CRISIS  
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600

9 November 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
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CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

9 November 1962

SOVIET SHIPPING FROM CUBA

Information available as of 0600 EST indicates that at least eight of the nine ships designated by the Soviets to carry missiles and missile equipment back to the USSR from Cuba now are under way.

We can confirm that five of them are carrying a total of 26 or 27 canvas-covered missile transporters, but information on the rest is not yet available.

[REDACTED]

The latest positions of six of the Soviet missile carriers puts them outbound from Cuba, headed for the North Atlantic. Two other ships left Mariel yesterday afternoon, having loaded missiles and related equipment. The ninth ship was still in the vicinity of Casilda late yesterday, probably loading missiles and missile equipment. At least one other ship not identified by the Soviets as a missile carrier appears to have loaded missile-associated gear and left Cuba for the USSR.

[REDACTED]

The Soviet passenger ship NIKOLAEVSK left Havana on 6 November. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] she is carrying a full load of military personnel. The ship has a normal capacity of about 350 passengers.

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Low-altitude photography of 6 November showed a large number of personnel also embarking on one of the missile carriers, the FIZIK KURCHATOV. It seems likely that some of the other ships removing missile equipment from Cuba are carrying Soviet military personnel.

Photography of 8 November showed that the two partly assembled IL-28s at San Julian airfield were not being worked on. There was no change in the status of other IL-28s or crates at either San Julian or Holguin. Evacuation of the Sagua La Grande MRBM area was continuing on 7 November.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]SOVIET SHIPS REMOVING MISSILES FROM CUBA

(as of 0600 EST, 9 November)

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Confirmed Cargo</u>	<u>Cargo Implied in Soviet Phone Conversation</u>
LABINSK	Under way	Associated equipment	2 missiles
METALLURG ANASOV	Under way	8 canvas-covered mis- sile transporters	8 missiles
BRATSK	Under way	2 canvas-covered mis- sile transporters	2 missiles
DIVNOGORSK	Under way	4 canvas-covered mis- sile transporters	4 missiles
VOLGOLES	Under way	7 canvas-covered mis- sile transporters	6 missiles
IVAN POLZUNOV	Under way	- - - -	6 missiles
FIZIK KURCHATOV	Under way	6 canvas-covered mis- sile transporters	6 missiles
LENINSKY KOMSOMOL	In port, Casilda	- - - -	6 missiles
ALAPAEVSK	Under way	Associated equipment	2 missiles
ALMETEVSK	In port	Associated equipment	not cited
ALEKSANDROVSK	Under way	<u>Associated equipment</u> 27 missile transporters	<u>not cited</u> 42 missiles

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]THE SOVIET POSITION

The USSR now seems to be hardening up a general position based on the following premises:

1. The IL-28s are not part of the bargain.
2. Any inspection in Cuba will be tied to "U Thant's plan" for a UN presence in the Caribbean--including the US, Cuba and other Latin American states--which will monitor the US commitment. (We have no clear understanding of this plan.)
3. The US will have to be satisfied with the present "alongside procedures" for verifying missile evacuation.
4. Now that all missiles have been evacuated or "are about to leave," the next step is to eliminate the quarantine and to negotiate the US guarantee.

Last night's meeting between top US and Soviet officials at the UN reflected Moscow's apparent conviction that the quick withdrawal of Soviet strategic missiles from Cuba will serve to frustrate US demands for effective UN verification of dismantling and removal. The conversations also disclosed that the USSR will continue to press for a formal declaration from President Kennedy guaranteeing Cuba against invasion by the US and other Western Hemisphere countries.

In his 8 November talks with US representatives, Kuznetsov took the position that the USSR had complied with its commitments on the withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba, and that it was now up to the US to live up to its own commitment on the question of guarantees for Cuba. Kuznetsov, outlining his view of US obligations, listed seven points comprising an elaboration of Castro's five demands together with what Kuznetsov referred to as U Thant's proposal for a UN presence in the Caribbean, including the US and other American states as well as Cuba. By claiming to endorse an U Thant proposal, the USSR probably hopes to put itself in a stronger position on the question of a "UN presence" in Cuba in case the US declines a formal guarantee to Cuba on the grounds that the USSR has failed to fulfill a commitment to UN verification.


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Kuznetsov again took advantage of Castro's opposition to any form of UN inspection in Cuba to reject Ambassador Stevenson's contention that the USSR had not fulfilled its commitment. The Soviet official maintained that implementation of verification procedures depended on Cuban agreement, which had not been forthcoming. Kuznetsov also rejected any speculation that missile warheads might have been left behind in Cuba, and added that warheads were taken out of Cuba immediately after the decision had been made to remove the missiles. He carefully limited his statement to warheads for missiles, and did not comment on Ambassador Stevenson's remark that Kuznetsov had said nothing about nuclear bombs. On the question of the IL-28s, Kuznetsov rigidly maintained that these aircraft were never included in a definition of offensive weapons.

In an earlier conversation with U Thant, Kuznetsov tried to pin down the precise relationship between Red Cross inspection personnel and the United Nations. He questioned the purpose of Red Cross inspection of incoming Soviet vessels inasmuch as all Soviet missiles were now on their way out of Cuba. U Thant stated that the ICRC had told him that it would not be responsible for the control or command of the operation. Thant then raised the suggestion of eliminating the Red Cross entirely and allowing the UN to assume complete control of the inspection machinery. Kuznetsov made no reply, but agreed to forward the proposal to his government.

Soviet officials continue to adhere to the position that Red Cross inspection can last only until the withdrawal of the missiles is completed, and have assured US officials of Moscow's desire to put the operation promptly into effect. They have attempted to place the blame for the delay on the US for its failure to accept the offer of Soviet vessels for the Red Cross inspection personnel.

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[REDACTED]

In its effort to placate Castro and overcome his intransigence, Moscow may be taking the unusual step of according Cuba "observer" status at bloc economic meetings.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION

The official silence on the Mikoyan-Castro talks continues.

The Havana correspondent of the French AFP news agency reported on 8 November that according to "a government source," after four formal meetings negotiations have come to a "complete standstill." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

The Chilean government is considering whether to break relations with Cuba. Present indications are that it will not break unless some or all of the other four OAS governments maintaining relations do likewise, or unless Cuba makes some new move infringing upon Chilean sovereignty. Chile's commercial relations with Cuba are evidently deteriorating.

Nicaraguan President Somoza probably expressed the views of most Caribbean and Central American governments in his press conference of 8 November by saying that he believed Castro would continue his efforts to undermine his government to the point that collective military intervention in Cuba might still prove necessary, with or without US participation.


#### BLOC MILITARY FORCES

General: There has been no significant change noted in the status of the bloc armed forces. [REDACTED]

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